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Psychoanalysis was conceived and devel-
oped for clinical purposes at the begin-
ning of the 20th century. Freud’s main
goal was to treat neurotic patients and
psychotic patients. As a consequence of
this great enterprise he developed a the-
ory to explain the functioning of the
human mind. A critical contribution of
his work was the theory of the uncon-
scious and the proposal that even if uncon-
scious, a representation can influence a
subject’s behavior. Freud believed that
unconscious thoughts and feelings may
cause a patient to experience life difficul-
ties and/or maladjustments. He proposed
that the process of freeing unconscious
thoughts could help a patient gain insight
into and ultimately improve his/her sit-
uation. Therefore, Freud developed tech-
niques to decode unconscious images, and
to free them through patient insight (e.g.,
Freud, 1901).
Cognitive neuroscience is a rather
young discipline. It was developed in the
1980’s and has been strongly linked to the
advancement of neuroimaging techniques
(mainly positron emission tomography,
PET, and functional magnetic resonance
imaging, fMRI). The main goal of this
discipline is to understand the function-
ing of the human brain/psyche. A conse-
quence of this great enterprise has been,
and hopefully will be, clinical applications.
Cognitive neuroscience is fundamentally
interested in processes/effects which can
be found in several subjects rather than in
the specific functioning of single subjects.
Of importance, at the moment, this disci-
pline does not provide a consensual and
comprehensive theory of the humanmind.
It has, nevertheless, demonstrated that
neuroscientific results can help to shape
psychological theories or to disentan-
gle between psychological theories (e.g.,
Henson, 2005; Poldrack, 2006; Legrand
and Ruby, 2009).
PITFALLS AND GAPS IN THE TWO
DISCIPLINES SHOWING THE NEED FOR
A BILATERAL COLLABORATION
Psychoanalysis is considered by many sci-
entists as an unscientific, an thus untrust-
worthy discipline. Psychoanalysis needs
then to improve its credibility. A collab-
oration with a scientific discipline such
as cognitive neuroscience could certainly
help to achieve this aim. In addition, at the
theoretical level, one cannot exclude that
the investigation of the neurophysiologi-
cal correlates of psychoanalytical concepts
(e.g., Kaplan-Solms and Solms, 2000)
could result in a better understanding
of the links between some psychoanalyti-
cal concepts, as neurophysiological results
have already resulted in a better under-
standing of concepts from experimental
psychology (e.g., Henson, 2005; Poldrack,
2006; Legrand and Ruby, 2009).
A current weakness of cognitive neu-
roscience is to ignore some important
brain/mind properties/characteristics,
such as (1) what is important to the
individual subjects, or in other words the
notion of “meaning” in the Freudian sense,
(2) the subject’s history and preferences,
(3) the notion of affective unconscious
which is closely related to the Freudian
unconscious, (4) the unconscious memory
of experienced events (UMEE), which
refers to the memory of an episode
or a scene that cannot be consciously
recollected. All of these issues are at the
core of our intimate mind; they are the
foundation of our identity. One can-
not expect to propose a comprehensive
theory of the human mind if neglect-
ing these issues. A collaboration with
psychoanalysis, which could be consid-
ered as a “science” of singularity, appears
then providential to help finding solu-
tions to address private issues in cognitive
neuroscience (Ruby, 2011).
WHATWOULD BE THE BENEFITS OF A
COLLABORATION? THE CASE OF UMEE
UMEE ARE NEGLECTED IN COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCE
In cognitive neuroscience, the dominant
theory of memory states that long-term
memory can be either explicit or implicit.
These two types of memory are often
referred to as declarative (composed of
episodic and semantic memory) and pro-
cedural memory or the “knowing what”
and the “knowing how.” This well-used
way of naming explicit and implicit mem-
ories show that the notion of “know-
ing what implicitly/unconsciously” is not
emphasized at the theoretical level. It
is also true at the experimental level.
The issue of UMEE in particular has
been barely investigated in cognitive neu-
roscience. Rather, this concept is often
ignored and possibly denied which has
important consequences on the interpre-
tation of results and thus theories of the
brain/mind.
The consideration of UMEE has
been lacking for example in research
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investigating memory and the self, as
illustrated by the article of Klein and
Gangi in the Annals of the New York
academy of sciences (Klein and Gangi,
2010). In this study, the authors aimed
to better understand the link between
the different types of self-related memory
systems, by investigating the representa-
tion of self-personality traits in patients
with amnesia. They report results showing
that some patients with episodic amnesia
(with traumatic or developmental etiolo-
gies) can, despite their amnesia, update
the representation of their own person-
ality traits. For Klein and Gangi, these
cases showed that episodic and seman-
tic memory systems were separate and
independent. Interestingly, they also con-
sidered at some point the possibility that
UMEE may participate in the updating of
personality traits since they wrote “K.C.
not only had access to semantic knowl-
edge of his own personality traits, but he
was also able to acquire new knowledge
about his personality. Yet this updating
occurred without his being able to episod-
ically recollect any information about the
behavioral events on which this updating
presumably was based.” Unfortunately, the
authors did not develop this point and
did not discuss the hypothesis of the
updating of personality traits based on
the UMEE. However, according to their
results, one cannot exclude this possi-
bility. How could one otherwise explain
their results? The most likely hypothesis
is that a semantic representation of one’s
own personality is elaborated using mem-
ories (conscious or unconscious) of past
episodes of one’s own life, and especially
episodes involving human interactions.
Klein and Gangi did not provide an alter-
native explanation but argued against this
hypothesis by stating that they “devoted
a substantial amount of [their] research
(consisting in multiple methods—for
example, priming techniques, transfer
appropriate processing, the method of
reversed association39, 55) to show that
exemplar-based self-knowledge is not
activated (consciously or unconsciously)
when participants perform semantic judg-
ments about the self.29, 35.” However,
these results do not exclude the possibility
that UMEE participate in the formation
of semantic knowledge even if it is not
activated during semantic tasks.
UMEE is also barely considered in
the field of dream research. Memory
(be it conscious or not) is the main
source of information available during
sleep. Previous studies have looked for
episodic recall in the content of dreams
(e.g., Fosse et al., 2003), but to my
knowledge, no studies have investigated
whether UMEE show up in dream con-
tent or not. Investigating autobiographi-
cal memory in the elderly, Grenier et al.
(2005) showed that dreams could bring
back very old memories and especially
memories from adolescence. Interestingly,
these results were not explained by a recent
reminiscence of these remote memories
because “the participants indicated that to
the best of their knowledge, they had not
thought of or talked about the different
elements experienced in their dreams since
the time of the original experience.” This
type of memory may be closely related to
unconscious memory (repressed or not)
because according to the participants, the
episode recalled in the dream had not
reached consciousness since this episode
actually happened. It seems thus fairly pos-
sible that dreams could bring unconscious
memories or representations to conscious-
ness, but this has not yet been tested.
UMEE ARE AT THE CORE OF
PSYCHOANALYTIC PRACTICES
Even if they are difficult to uncover and
confirm, UMEE does exist. Here is a
tragic example from the French news
from the winter of 2012 (e.g., Sud Ouest
29/02/2012; Le Monde 03/03/2012). A
women living in Lyon, France (Zahia H.)
recalled the memory of being raped and
assaulted 37 years prior, in 1973, upon
awakening from general anesthesia in
2010. The surgery (one of many previ-
ous surgeries) was indicated to treat dis-
abilities caused by this aggression. Thirty
seven years ago, Zahia awoke from a coma
induced by the episode and had no mem-
ory of the rape and the head injury which
she had sustained. Zahia’s mother decided
not to tell her what had occurred. Thirty
seven years after, when Zahia recalled the
memory of this tragic episode her mother
was dead.
This case demonstrates the existence of
unconscious memories of important expe-
riences (the facts can be verified). One
can easily intuit reading this story, that
memories, even if implicit/unconscious,
may influence behavior (for example,
unexplained fear in particular situations)
and play an important role in a sub-
ject’s life, as hypothesized by Freud.
In support of this single case, Mitchell
(2006) managed to produce experimen-
tal results showing the existence of long-
lasting unconscious memory of images.
He demonstrated that pictures presented
1–3 s could induce a priming effect 17
years after presentation, even in subjects
who reported no conscious recollection of
their participation in the original labora-
tory session.
Currently, cognitive neuroscience can-
not easily explain the recovery of a mem-
ory 30 or 40 years later. By contrast, this
phenomenon can be explained from a
psychoanalytic perspective (When I previ-
ously described Zahia’s case in a confer-
ence, René Roussillon, psychoanalyst and
professor of psychology at the University
of Lyon, predicted that themother of Zahia
was dead when she recovered the memory
of the rape even though I did not men-
tion this fact). This comes as no surprise
since the core of psychoanalytic practice
is centered on unconscious memories or
representations that induce life difficulties
and/or maladjustment and on the means
to free them.




On the one hand, UMEE is a compo-
nent that can be easily incorporated into a
theoretical model of memory in cognitive
neuroscience; on the other hand, this type
of memory plays a central role in psycho-
analysis since conflicts and trauma may
lead (via repression or not) to the creation
of UMEE. Therefore, the UMEE (result-
ing from repression or not) could be a
strong convergence point between psycho-
analysis and cognitive neuroscience, which
may help to built bridges between the two
disciplines. Below, possible benefits of a
collaboration between psychoanalysis and
cognitive neuroscience on UMEE.
New hypotheses on the functioning of
memory systems in cognitive neuroscience
Adding a psychoanalytical perspective
to reflections on cognitive neuroscience
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experiments may result in new hypotheses.
This can be illustrated by the two exam-
ples described above. First, the hypothe-
sis of the possible participation of UMEE
in the formation of semantic knowledge
about the self derives from a psychoana-
lytical perspective on the functioning of
the mind/brain. Testing this hypothesis
would help to better understand the for-
mation of the semantic representation of
one’s personality traits, which according to
Klein and Gangi (2010), is still a mystery:
“Of the systems of self we have exam-
ined, the semantic self-knowledge system
seems the most resilient in the face of
the cognitive chaos resulting from devel-
opmental and/or environmental damage
to the brain. This is both an empirical
fact and a mystery for which we have, at
present, no explanation.” Second, accord-
ing to Freud (e.g., Freud, 1901), uncon-
scious representation may surface during
dreams. Collaboration with psychoana-
lysts could assist in the design of experi-
ments to test this hypothesis. For exam-
ple, one could try to use the free associa-
tion method to test whether free associa-
tion initiated from the words of a dream
would lead to UMEE. The results would
help to elucidate whether dreams are
indeed the royal road to the unconscious
and could also have important implica-
tions for theories of sleep, dreams and
memory.
New paradigms to test unexplored issues in
cognitive neuroscience
The absence of consideration of the
UMEE in cognitive neuroscience is cer-
tainly due to the difficulty in investigating
such private issue using an experimen-
tal approach. Psychoanalysts who work
to make unconscious representations con-
scious may be helpful in developing meth-
ods to address this issue in cognitive
neuroscience. Previous interdisciplinary
work proves that novel paradigms can
enable a scientific investigation of con-
cepts that are seemingly impossible to
explore. For example, Howard Shevrin,
psychoanalyst and Professor of Psychology
at The University of Michigan, devel-
oped shrewd paradigms to investigate
unconscious processes at the experimental
level. Using event related potentials and
a free association method, his team iden-
tified neurophysiologic markers of sub-
liminal perceptions and showed that
subliminal images were processed in a
complex and associative way (Shevrin
and Fritzler, 1968). Using similar means
(mild electric shock presented 800ms after
images or words presented subliminally)
he also demonstrated that aversive condi-
tioning can occur unconsciously (Shevrin,
2001). These results had a great impact on
the neuroscientific community and pre-
cipitated an interest in unconscious pro-
cesses.
Optimize therapeutic means in the
psychoanalytic practice
The investigation of UMEE in cognitive
neuroscience should result in a better
understanding of the context of forma-
tion (repression or not) and the neu-
rophysiological basis of UMEE (possibly
dependent on the context of formation).
Theoretically, this should help to optimize
the therapeutic means to act on or free
such memories.
CONCLUSION
Even if difficult, unconscious processes,
private issues (preferences, history, what
matters for a subject.) and, more gener-
ally, psychoanalytic concepts have to be
addressed at the experimental level to
achieve a comprehensive theory of the
human mind. Another great benefit of
such an endeavor would be to provide
objective arguments and allow a construc-
tive and scientific debate about whether
Freudian or psychoanalytical concepts are
plausible and useful. In other words, a
collaboration between psychoanalysis and
cognitive neuroscience may be the best
way to escape from the sterile and coun-
terproductive hostility between the dis-
ciplines and to move forward together
in order to benefit science and medical
practices.
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